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Part 5: Concluding 
Observations
omplex systems abound, and many different disciplines
 are concerned with understanding catastrophic change 
in such systems. People who study atmospheric science are 
very interested in precipitous climate change, people in 
ecology look extensively at so-called regime shifts and 
precipitous ecological change, engineers design complex 
systems so as to lessen the risk of catastrophic failures. 
What opportunities exist to leverage this great interest from 
across many fields for the benefit of the central banks and 
financial authorities, the financial sector, and the nation’s 
economy more generally? The conference explored this 
question by focusing on three principal issues associated 
with catastrophic events in complex systems: risk assessment, 
modeling and prediction, and mitigation.
Risk Assessment 
The economists, central bankers, market practitioners, and 
scientists and engineers at the conference agreed in large part 
on key mechanisms that produce instability in large systems. 
Positive feedback—such as the portfolio insurance and 
collateral and margin calls that may have played a role in 
driving the stock market down so dramatically in October 
1987—is one such mechanism. Another, synchrony, was 
mentioned by Simon Levin of  Princeton University as possible 
in any complex adaptive system, sometimes with deleterious 
consequences, and several conference participants pointed 
to the increase in systemic vulnerability that can come about 
when behaviors of various actors become too similar. Charles 
Taylor of the Risk Management Association amplified this 
idea in describing how banks’ decision making has changed: 
A number of years ago, while there was a high level of 
homogeneity in the mix of business taken on by banks, their 
quantitative methods were less precise and more ad hoc—
with some variation in the speed of their responses to events. 
The result was that individual banks would differ in how they 
executed processes and how quickly they responded to changes 
in conditions. Thus, there would be heterogeneity of response 
to crisis. But now, as the banking system has become more 
integrated and the time lags have been driven out by efficiency 
measures, in Taylor’s view the system may be evolving in 
a direction that makes it more fragile in some respects.
One area in which the approaches of financial economists 
and market practitioners differ from those of engineers 
such as Yacov Haimes of the University of Virginia and 
Massoud Amin of the University of Minnesota is in identifying 
extreme events. The conference background paper1 and the 
keynote remarks of Governor Kohn discussed how potential 
extreme events are identified through stress testing. This 
procedure involves developing a model of an economic or 
market process, applying extreme values from the distribution 
of the drivers of the model, and examining the output. Those 
who commented on stress testing acknowledged that a 
limitation of this approach is its assumption that behavior 
in the model does not change dramatically under extreme 
conditions. This assumption conflicts with what market 
participants in part 1 of this volume vividly described as the 
1The background paper can be found in Appendix B.
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feeling of regime shift during the events of 1997-98: the Asian 
currency crisis, the Russian default, and the Long-Term Capital 
Management collapse.
Part 3 of this volume explains the approaches followed by 
Haimes and Amin for identifying possible extreme events—for 
instance, a shutdown of the electric grid—and considering 
what set of circumstances could produce the failure. Haimes 
described a systematic process using small models and 
arranging factors in a hierarchy that probes what failures, 
mechanisms, and regime shifts in what combination might 
lead to catastrophic failure. This paradigm of identifying a 
range of possible bad outcomes (risks) and backtracking to 
estimate their probabilities and identify options for reducing 
their likelihood or lessening their impact is a common one in 
engineering. It is in contrast to the paradigm in which a given 
set of conditions is stipulated and then one explores, by means 
of theory or simulation, how events might unfold in response 
to a given stimulus. Taylor referred to the former paradigm 
as “looking through the wrong end of the telescope.”
While Haimes’s process inevitably involves intuition and 
judgment, the data-rich environment in which his methods 
are applied grounds his modeling sufficiently so that one can 
draw meaningful inferences, even if they are not susceptible 
to classical statistical tests. For example, this method can be 
used to refine estimates of unconditional and conditional 
probabilities and correlations as well as the measurement of 
impacts. These estimates allow the analyst to make informed 
judgments about factors that could trigger systemic collapse. 
The stacking, if not necessarily nesting, of models in tiers also 
allows the analyst to assess how behavioral changes during a 
regime shift affect the potential for catastrophic failure.
Central banks over the last two decades have increasingly 
devoted resources to research and analysis of financial stability. 
A major purpose of these efforts is to identify potential triggers 
of instability: events as well as market, policy, or institutional 
mechanisms that can generate instability or propagate it once 
the financial system is disrupted. The methodology used to 
manage risk in engineering may provide insight into means 
of identifying areas of potential financial instability more 
systematically. Central banks may have an interest in 
evaluating these methodologies. 
Modeling, Prediction, 
and Management
The conference generated lively discussion of differences in 
the approach to research in economics, as illustrated in part 2 
of this volume, and the research carried out in ecology and 
engineering, as glimpsed in part 3. Economists were impressed 
by the quantity and quality of data available to researchers in 
the examples cited by Levin and by Haimes and Amin. 
Research Culture and Directions
Douglas Gale of New York University suggested that the 
conference brought out “a very striking contrast” between 
some excellent theoretical research in economics and the 
pragmatic, holistic modeling of risk in engineered systems. 
The theoretical research was by young economists who are 
coming up with new ideas and new concepts for understanding 
very important phenomena. Although the panel of three talks 
cannot represent the entire spectrum of economic research, 
Gale felt it demonstrated the theoretical building blocks that 
economists use when thinking about problems of financial 
instability. The engineering research by Amin and Haimes 
represents a very different approach. They engaged in very 
large-scale projects—comprehensive, holistic modeling of 
risk phenomena using real data—that aim at realism and at 
prediction and control of particular systems rather than at 
understanding general principles of a more generic system. 
As a means to that end, Haimes stressed that these projects 
integrate different models, using many different approaches 
and techniques, rather than just focusing on one model. 
In Gale’s view, the way economists select their research 
projects reflects their incentives to pursue that course. 
Economists certainly know about many of the techniques 
described in the course of the conference—neural networks, 
stochastic approximation, dynamical systems, optimal control, 
and others—and they use them to the extent that they help to 
accomplish their goals. One can readily imagine adapting the 
kind of large-scale approaches undertaken by Haimes and 
Amin to model the financial system. So, one logically asks 
why academic economists have not pursued that line of 
research—why they are not using such approaches to provide 
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a foundation for understanding systemic risks. The primary 
reason is money: In academic economics, in Gale’s view, 
no funding exists for that kind of large-scale research.
The relatively low level of funding for research in economics 
has had a number of effects on how the discipline is organized. 
It affects education, promotion and tenure, the publication 
process, and so on. If, for example, academic economists 
want to publish in a top journal, an achievement that is very 
important for their professional recognition and advancement, 
their papers must normally be about one model and focus on 
economics rather than other issues. The papers typically must 
include a methodological innovation. The prestigious journals 
would not be interested in research that consists of applying 
well-known techniques or models to some very practical 
problem. 
In contrast, engineers as well as scientists in some applied 
fields have more latitude in the types of research they can 
pursue and the roles for which they are rewarded, in part 
because a wider array of funding sources exists. While some 
engineering research is geared solely toward scholarly 
publications, other work (even by the same individuals) might 
consist of studies that inform very pragmatic decisions. The 
premier honorary society for engineers in the United States—
the National Academy of Engineering—includes a mix of those 
who have advanced the academic foundations of their field and 
those who have advanced the profession in other ways, perhaps 
as founders or managers of major enterprises. Economists, 
operating in a very different culture, end up working in small 
teams on what are to some extent theoretical, as opposed 
to practical, problems. Even when conducting empirical 
studies—as in applied economics—or when addressing issues 
of regulation or optimal policy, economists generally do not 
have incentives to produce work that can be immediately 
applied. Economists are looking for insight, and that is a very 
different kind of activity. Gale indicated that he could imagine 
a role for research into systemic risk, one that would be 
very exciting. 
Some discussion centered on the level of resources devoted 
to understanding systemic risk, with several conference 
participants observing that the amount spent on studying 
systemic risk is a miniscule fraction of the amount spent on 
understanding and managing the risks of individual entities. 
Gale noted that a prerequisite for significant change in the type 
of research economists conduct is a large-scale shift in funding 
for the discipline. The need is not just to provide money for 
particular studies on the financial system or systemic risk, 
but to change an entire discipline, which means changing 
incentives across the field. 
Vincent Reinhart of the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System raised the possibility that change could occur 
through revisiting scholarly work that had been overlooked 
by the profession. In that connection, he quoted from work 
by Levin (1992): “A popular fascination of theorists in all 
disciplines, because of the potential for mechanistic under-
standing, has been with systems in which the dynamics at one 
level can be understood as the collective behavior of aggregates 
of similar units.” That is an appealing mechanism, if it were 
true. But it is not true for the financial system or an economy 
as a whole. The economy is a network of heterogeneous, not 
similar, agents. Instead of transmission lines, transformers, 
and switches, financial markets have market makers, brokers, 
market utilities, beta providers,2 and individual investors with 
different strategies. Economists have known for thirty years 
that heterogeneity cannot be assumed away: In Micro Motives 
and Macro Behavior, Nobel Laureate Thomas Schelling 
provided many examples of how individual behaviors 
produced clustering and self-organization. This conference 
is evidence that the lure of a more mechanistic model 
is waning. 
The Role of Data 
Reinhart suggested that the difference between the research 
style of economists and that of engineers and physical scientists 
(at least as demonstrated at the conference) might revolve 
around data and computing power. As noted in part 3 of this 
volume, there is more of a tradition of data sharing, and more 
nonproprietary data with which to work, in engineering and 
the physical and life sciences. As economists gain access to large 
data sets—opening up the possibility of seeing redacted data on 
individual transactions and individual behavior, as exemplified 
by the Fedwire projects described in part 4—economists and 
financial economists will be driven to cooperate more. To 
the extent that economic researchers start developing more 
complex models to represent the heterogeneity of economic 
agents and combining them with large data sets—for instance, 
2Beta providers are investors whose trading drives the prices of related assets to 
converge toward their normal relationships when prices diverge.
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of individual transactions in markets—their work will likely 
become more computational, as has been the pattern in much 
of the natural sciences.
In studies of systemic risk in the financial sector, key data 
are transaction prices, transaction volumes and timing, 
financial institution position and exposure measures, and 
economic and other news. In centrally organized exchange 
markets, such as the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), good 
data on prices, volumes, and timing are collected and could 
be used in research. In over-the-counter markets, where 
transactions are arranged between institutions and are not 
recorded centrally, electronic quotation and trading systems 
have improved the availability of price information. But a 
preponderance of information required to study systemic 
risk at some scale remains the proprietary information of 
financial institutions.  
The central bankers, regulators, and economists were 
impressed by the cooperative arrangements in the electrical 
power generating industry for sharing proprietary information 
used in researching and managing systemic stability and the 
insight gained from using detailed data. As risk management 
and financial analysis have advanced over the last two decades, 
financial institutions have developed large databases of 
financial information. While financial firms are unlikely to 
share very recent data, the proprietary value of information 
in detailed financial institution data may decay fairly quickly, 
given the rapidity with which market conditions and market 
opportunities fade. If financial institutions share central 
bankers and regulators’ interest in risk management tools, 
the examples of data sharing from other industries might be 
helpful in demonstrating the benefit of even a modest 
information-sharing effort. 
Potential Applications to Policy
The conference also compared sources of robustness in 
financial and economic systems with those in ecological and 
engineering systems and considered the implications for 
mitigation. Several participants agreed that there is a need 
for more research into robustness strategies in preventing 
systemic events and for more analysis of the implications 
for policy responses when such events occur.  
The sessions revealed some important differences in 
approaches to regime shift and hysteresis, with implications 
for mitigation. Charles Lucas of AIG (since retired), a member 
of the National Academy’s Board on Mathematical Sciences 
and Their Applications opened the conference with a 
discussion of the dramatic and deleterious regime shift that 
occurred in the wake of the financial crisis of the late 1920s and 
early 1930s: the shift from the booming, but troubled, 1920s to 
the Great Depression. Economists considering systemic risk 
have wrestled with the questions of when a financial disturb-
ance can or will lead to macroeconomic effects, when those 
macroeconomic impacts represent a new equilibrium for the 
economy, whether the shift to a new and inferior equilibrium 
is the result of financial disturbance or policy errors, and what 
sort of hysteresis—resistance to a return to the previous 
equilibrium state—exists.
The effects of some financial disturbances are seen as 
salutary by many economists and central bankers, leading to 
improved risk management and a better long-term allocation 
of resources, at least in some sectors. The banking problems 
of the early 1990s and the failure of Barings in 1995 have been 
widely cited as precipitating substantial innovation that 
improved credit and counterparty risk management. 
Many economists cite the resilience of financial markets in 
handling disturbances, even long-run disturbances, principally 
through the effectiveness of the price mechanism, but also 
by creating new markets and contractual and institutional 
arrangements. Even if prices fall very sharply, revaluation 
of assets and liabilities, if allowed to occur, often results in 
markets finding a new equilibrium after transactions resume. 
That process may take weeks, as it did after the 1987 stock 
market crash, when even though prices rebounded sharply 
the next day, overall trading activity and international equity 
capital flows took about ten weeks to recover to normal levels. 
Or it may take longer, as it did after banks began writing down 
their real estate loans and selling them off in the early 1990s. 
Thus, the potential for regime shift and subsequent hysteresis 
as a result of systemic events in financial markets is to some 
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extent offset by the flexibility and resilience of the markets 
in assessing and responding to systemic shocks.
Consistent with Levin’s discussion of rigidity and 
flexibility as strategies to create robustness in ecosystems, 
financial systems appear to possess flexibility as a key 
bulwark of robustness. One challenge for financial markets 
is that the underlying infrastructure that manages the flow 
of transactions may have some inherent rigidity because 
of its legacy technologies and reliance on scale and network 
economies; another question is whether the flexibility of 
some activities is reduced by consolidation.
Rigidity and flexibility are opposite, but equally valid, 
strategies to achieve robustness: a system can either be strong 
enough to resist disturbances or it can be flexible enough to 
“bend” to them. These two strategies also map to differing 
perspectives on policymakers’ appropriate response to 
financial disturbances. While one response to financial crisis 
might be to shut markets down, under the implicit assump-
tion that they are not strong enough to withstand the shock, 
financial economists and financial authorities generally 
recommend that markets remain open—a view based 
on their trust in the flexibility of markets. There are 
circumstances in which markets have been suspended: In the 
immediate aftermath of the destruction of September 11, 
2001, the equity markets remained closed for four days; 
the NYSE instituted circuit breakers for trading after the 
October 19, 1987, stock market crash; and banking holidays 
are sometimes declared during major weather events.  
In responding to systemic risk, monetary and financial 
authorities need to think about the time frame over which 
policy is expected to work. Reinhart speculated that the 
presence of portfolio insurance and dynamic hedging in 1987 
might have been a market mechanism that tended to amplify 
the downtrend. It is not obvious what a central bank could 
do in that event; the market was falling, and the central bank 
could not just step into that process. It was able to remind 
commercial banks that downstreaming funds to investment 
banks would be a good thing, and it provided assurances 
about the availability of liquidity. The markets were kept 
open, trading resumed, and the markets rose subsequently; 
the economy performed generally well despite the destruction 
of wealth associated with the initial stock price decline. 
Reinhart asserted that quick action is the right step to take, 
but there is not nearly as much research available to inform 
crisis management as there is to understand crisis propagation. 
He thought it would be appropriate to apply the sophistication 
of the work presented at the conference to crisis management 
as well. 
David Levermore of the University of Maryland suggested 
that the ultimate benefit of the new directions suggested by the 
conference might not apply so much to managing risk, which 
is an important component of course, but to understanding 
the economy better. Improved models of systemic risk can 
incorporate and build on the theory and intuition of central 
bankers and economists and refine them through additional 
quantitative insight. For example, in redesigning a regulation 
that currently affects all institutions of a certain type, future 
policymakers might include gradations, such that perhaps 
only large institutions are affected while smaller institutions 
are relatively unencumbered because their health does not 
constitute a systemic risk. Having that greater degree of latitude 
will allow policymakers to be more creative and productive. 
Reinhart noted that such a tiered system is already emerging as 
a result of the Basel II Accord on bank capital requirements.
Taylor added that the public policy objective is to under-
stand how systems can evolve so as to be more robust to tail 
events. As Reinhart noted, though, we simply do not have 
much data on tail events, by definition. Robert Litzenberger 
of Azimuth Trust amplified that point. When we attempt to 
implement risk models for catastrophic periods, we want 
objective measures based in some way on historical data. 
But if the data pertain to just one event, then that is a scenario 
analysis, and there is no statistical reliability with respect to 
its assessment. That is a major problem we face when we use 
sophisticated empirical techniques with very limited data to 
model the system fully. When we try to extend this thinking 
beyond the Fedwire system, with its good data, to the broader 
financial system, we run out of the data that would be needed 
if the models are to make useful predictions. Litzenberger 
compared the situation with that of econometric models of the 
U.S. economy that he studied in graduate school. They were 
impressive, but in truth they never predicted very well, and 
many researchers eventually became disillusioned with some of 
those models. To arrive at a better understanding of systemic 
risk and to improve risk management tools and policies, the 
discussion pointed to the immense potential value from 
developing rich data sets of financial information, financial 
asset prices, and institutions’ risks and earnings. References
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